Some of the disputes about species concepts can be resolved through clari¢cation of the conceptual issues. Others are intractable because incompatible preferences are being optimized. According to the current biological consensus species (taxa) are populations rendered cohesive by sex. The philosophical consensus has it that the species and other categories are (abstract) classes, whereas particular species and other taxa are (concrete) individuals (in the ontological sense). Natural kinds are classes that have the properties they do because of laws of nature. Individuals such as species and clades owe their properties to history, not laws of nature; they are not kinds at all and calling them natural kinds is, therefore, grossly misleading. Having the species of taxonomy be equivalent to the species of evolutionary theory facilitates the integration of history and laws of nature within biology. E¡orts to de¢ne the species category on the basis of similarity create misleading impressions about the laws and mechanisms of speciation processes. A diversity of incompatible species concepts (pluralism) is undesirable because the various kinds of units that are called 'species' di¡er with respect to the underlying laws of nature that make them natural kinds.
Introduction
Fish provide splendid materials for evolutionary research. They were as a matter of fact the creatures that led me to discover the'size-advantage'model that explains sequential hermaphroditism among organisms in general (Ghiselin 1969) . They have been a major focus of attention in studies of species and speciation. This is particularly well exempli¢ed by a long series of investigations on the diversi¢cation of ¢shes in the Great Lakes of Africa. Such research continues to £ourish, partly because new techniques have been brought to bear on traditional materials. Molecular systematics and cladistic analysis have brought new kinds of data and new ways of processing them into play. In the same spirit, ichthyologists have been particularly active in applying new ideas about the philosophy of systematics to bear upon their subject. The new ideas about species concepts that have gained attention in the last few years have many important implications for how ichthyologists and biologists in general might conduct their research.
My goal here is to explain the conceptual background to contemporary discussions of species concepts and to suggest ways in which di¡erent positions may perhaps be reconciled. I begin by introducing a series of challenging and controversial topics. After brie£y addressing the question of what is meant by a'concept' I will present a sketch of what is, more or less, the consensus view with respect to what a species is, both biologically and philosophically. That will serve as a convenient starting point for discussing alternative views. In deciding what to do when faced with such alternatives it is important to go back to fundamentals and then to consider the consequences. Once that has been accomplished it becomes evident that there may be no one solution that will simultaneously optimize everything that everybody wants to optimize. That is a general problem with respect to classi¢cation. Taxonomic revision has, at least potentially, the advantage of bringing classi¢cation better into line with evolutionary history. But intellectual retooling is costly, and people di¡er with respect to how willing they are to pay the price. I, for one, do not want to memorize a classi¢cation system until I am sure that it represents more than improperly polarized characters, misaligned sequences, and computer artifacts. To a considerable extent the controversies are fuelled by con£icting value judgements with respect to such tradeo¡s. If value judgements have to be made, let us hope that they are the values of earnest seekers after truth, rather than those of academic politicians.
What is a species concept?
Various authors have presented lists of supposedly di¡erent 'species concepts' (Mayden1999; Lherminer and Solignac 2000) . To what extent these are really di¡erent concepts or just di¡erent names for the same concept depends to a large extent upon what is meant by a concept. I think that a lot of them can be synonymized (see Ghiselin1997).
But be this as it may, the basic issue is how we ought to use language, in particular how to de¢ne the word 'species'. The de¢nition of a term is the criteria for its applicability to the objects of our discourse. So, a species de¢nition generally means the properties that are both necessary and su⁄cient for an entity such as a population or a group of entities such as organisms, to be a species. It is often confused with the criteria that determine whether an organism is an 'element' of a particular species. There are various other ways to make the same distinction or underscore the same point. One way is to say that a species de¢nition is a de¢nition of the species in general, not of any particular species. Another way is to say that it is a de¢nition of the category species, not of any taxon such as Carcharodon carcharias.
'Species' is a theoretical term in evolutionary biology, and like many theoretical terms in the sciences it is very hard to give a terse verbal formula that catches all the nuances of its meaning. But in that respect it is no di¡erent from other theoretical terms in biology (such as'organism'and'life') or in the physical sciences (such as 'atom'and 'molecule') (Ghiselin 1997) . The di⁄culty of providing a terse and accurate de¢nition of a term does not necessarily mean that we have no idea what we are talking about.
The biological consensus
We can characterize the consensus view among biologists as follows. Species are populations. They are held together (rendered cohesive) by sex. They are kept separate from one another to the extent that, even when sympatric, they do not fuse together into single populations, at least under ordinary conditions. In other words they are reproductively isolated. (Remember that just as it is populations, and not organisms, that evolve reproductive isolation here refers to a property of populations, and not organisms.) Species play an important role in evolutionary theory. They are the most incorporative units that participate in evolutionary processes, such as speciation. The species is one of a hierarchy of such units, each of which may play a di¡erent role in evolutionary theory, and each of which has somewhat di¡er-ent laws of nature. Species speciate, organisms copulate, genes get replicated, etc. Above the species level there is an important break: after speciation has taken place, cohesion is lost and we get purely historical entities, called clades, which do not participate as units in evolutionary processes.
The philosophical consensus
The philosophical consensus may likewise be characterized. The species (category) is a class; it is a kind of population. It has de¢ning properties (such as being a population) that determine its membership. The members (instances) of the class of species are each and every species. A species (taxon) is a particular thing, in other words an individual in the ontological sense; it is not a kind of anything whatsoever. It has no de¢ning properties, and it has neither instances nor members. Its elements are its parts or, one might prefer to say, its components. The di¡er-ence between classes and (ontological) individuals is altogether fundamental with respect to the role that they play in scienti¢c thinking. Classes are abstractions, and have no particular location in time and space, whereas individuals, whether they be organisms, species, or celestial bodies, are concrete particular things that come into being, cease to exist, and have locations (in other words, they are spatio-temporally restricted). Only (ontological) individuals can evolve or otherwise participate in processes. It is not just physically impossible for species in the abstract to evolve or organism in general to copulate. It is impossible to the point that one cannot even imagine what such a claim would mean.
History and law: individuals and kinds
I trust that those who are familiar with recent developments in the philosophy of biology will ¢nd the above summary quite familiar and reasonably straight-forward, though somebody encountering it for the ¢rst time may have problems, especially because the more general sense of 'individual' is not as widely known as the biological one. I have been asked whether we should not have two di¡erent terms for two di¡erent concepts, and I agree. With a little practice one can easily learn to call organisms 'organisms' when that is what one means, and that has been my own practice for some years. As this exposition unfolds, I will attempt to unpack the philosophy a bit more. Further elaboration is also to be found in the contributions of Wiley (2002) and Mayden (2002) in the present issue of this journal.
One point that I emphasized in my recent book (Ghiselin 1997) was how the fact that species and other lineages are individuals can help us to clarify the roles of history on the one hand and the laws of nature on the other in evolutionary biology. The kind of science that deals with laws of nature (nomothetic science) provides generalizations about classes of individuals, whereas that which deals with individuals as such (idiographic science) is purely concerned with matters of contingent, historical fact. (It is unfortunate that this distinction has been treated under the rubric of pattern and process; if anything participates in a process it simply has to be an individual.)
The classes of interest to evolutionary biologists are the ones for which there exist laws of nature. Such classes have been called 'natural kinds'and they are familiar to us in the physical sciences. The elements are natural kinds, and the periodic table is a classi¢-cation system with classes of classes. (e.g. the class of halogens includes those of chlorine and bromine.) Not everything that might qualify as a class is such a natural kind; however, that is one reason why purely arbitrary or subjective groups are not taken seriously in scienti¢c generalization: the class of obscene-looking worms, for example. For the present discussion, the important point about laws of nature is that they make no reference to any particular individual; rather they are about kinds, or classes of individuals and they are true, irrespective of time and place, of everything to which they apply. In physics, the laws of nature are about kinds of celestial bodies, not about Saturn or the Milky Way. By analogy with physics and astronomy, we would expect the laws of nature in biology be about kinds of participants in the living world, and not be about Charles Darwin, Homo sapiens, or Mammalia.
The question as to whether there are in fact laws of nature in biology has been seriously debated. The individuality thesis clari¢ed such matters by suggesting where we should look for such laws (Hull 1975) . Given that taxa such as species and clades are individuals, trying to ¢nd laws of nature for them is obviously a waste of time. Rather, the biological laws of nature refer to classes of biological objects, such as classes of populations, including classes of species. They also may refer to classes of processes, such as classes of speciation events. Such laws may be statistical, they may seem tautological, but they are not far to seek. As the e¡ective population size goes up, the rate of ¢xation of alleles through genetic drift goes down. What I have called 'Mayr's Law' is a bit closer to home for systematists (Ghiselin 1989) . Under ordinary conditions, speciation without antecedent geographical isolation does not occur. As science progresses, we may anticipate the discovery of a rich variety of laws of nature, applicable to the di¡erent objects that occupy the various levels of the hierarchy of life. Given that di¡erent processes go on at the various levels, we may expect that the laws will be quite di¡erent depending upon the level.
Because the nomothetic order is now understood to be so di¡erent from the historical one, we can see more clearly how the two can, and cannot, coexist in our interpretation of the world. On the one hand, laws and history play very di¡erent roles in our thinking. On the other hand, there cannot be a real contradiction between them. What must happen, irrespective of time and space, has to be consistent with what has happened at particular times and places. Our reconstructions of history must not contradict the laws of nature. Conversely, any hypothesized law that contradicts the historical facts has to be rejected for that very reason. Finally, the laws of nature and the data of history can be interconnected so as to form explanatory historical narratives, including what are called 'scenarios'.
Because the two kinds of natural order are so di¡er-ent, and because they play such di¡erent roles in scientists' thinking, we must not expect the one to do the job of the other, and we must not expect the impossible from our knowledge of either of them. By 'impossible' I mean something much stronger than just impracticable or unknowable: I mean contrary to the fundamental principles of logic and metaphysics. That would have to be something utterly preposterous, like a round square or the colour of the distance between Paris and London.
Objections to the philosophical consensus Although I have described what I call the'consensus' view, not everybody accepts it and fewer still are happy with it. Some of the objections I have encountered, both in the literature and in informal discussion, can be addressed in the light of what has just been said here. Some people seem to want taxa such as species to be natural kinds, perhaps because they have accepted a naive philosophy of science according to which laws of nature are everything and an historical science is a contradiction in terms. A good example is Bock (1986 Bock ( , 1994 , who has attempted to construct an approach to phylogenetics based upon physics. If species were natural kinds, there would have to be at least one law of nature for at least one of them. No legitimate example has been presented. I for one am not holding my breath. A few other authors have presented watered-down versions of the notion that species are natural kinds (Ruse 1987; Mahner and Bunge 1997; Boyd 1999; Wilson 1999 ). There has been some loose talk about 'law-like statements'about species, but nobody has ever provided a coherent discussion of what this is supposed to mean. Any such statement would have to be spatio-temporally unrestricted to qualify as a genuine law of nature, and none of these authors has provided anything even remotely resembling that. The ontological distinction between classes and individuals cannot be e¡aced by pretending that they are separated by the sort of inde¢nite boundary that sometimes exists between individuals such as the 'persons'of a colonial animal. It cannot be both possible and impossible for a thing to participate in processes under any circumstance whatsoever. Things either are spatio-temporally restricted or they are not.
Some of these persons have actually gone so far as to suggest that I have based my views upon an outdated philosophy (Bock 2000) . On the contrary, it is they who are attempting to salvage the kind of set theoretical metaphysics that was popular in the middle part of the twentieth century. By way of driving this point home, I should mention some ill-conceived attempts at coming up with the sort of counter-example that might refute my claims. I have maintained that individuals are, absolutely and without quali¢cation, concrete rather than abstract (Ghiselin 1997) . Mahner (1999) attempts to produce a counterexample. He claims that Don Quixote is abstract. This assertion makes sense only if he overlooks the sense of abstractness that I carefully spelled out in my book. Don Quixote is a novel, of which an imaginary person, the hero, is a component. Cervantes was the author of Don Quixote, not of novel in the abstract, something that is downright inconceivable. Cultural entities and their components come into being at a particular location in time and space. Don Quixote did not exist during the Palaeozoic, whether one means the whole novel or the character that is one of its parts. (For more about culture, see Ghiselin 2000.) Are there perhaps individuals that are not spatio-temporally restricted? Again, my opponents have tried, and failed, to come up with the kind of example that would support that thesis. One possibility is gravitational ¢elds. All the matter in the universe attracts all the rest. But the gravitational ¢elds of the sun and the moon can easily be located^as those of us who study marine animals and have to deal with the tides are well aware. The ¢elds in question did not exist before the celestial objects did.
Are species natural kinds?
Be all this as it may, some biologists seem to want taxa that function like natural kinds. Laws of nature allow for prediction, and a classi¢cation such as the periodic table of the elements is indeed predictive. But note that it is predictive in a very strong sense. The laws of nature do not tell us just what has happened as a matter of contingent fact, they tell us what must necessarily happen and cannot be otherwise, in the past, the present, or the future. There is no way in which systematic biology can give us 'predictive' classi¢cations in that sense. The properties of taxa cannot be derived without doing one's historical research.Yet in spite of that we can make pretty good forecasts. The reason is that there exist certain properties, often called 'conservative characters', that change very slowly if at all. These include the sites in ribosomal RNA that are invariant because changing them would abolish protein formation. The laws of nature tell us here why the character is invariant: lethal genes are eliminated by natural selection. For many conservative characters, we only have the empirical evidence of their constancy to go in. But observe that the laws make no reference to any particular individuals, and whether they apply to a given taxon is a matter of historical contingency. A failure to grasp this point is one reason why it is Gri⁄ths (1999, p. 222) who is wrong, not Ghiselin and Hull, in asserting that natural kinds can have historical essences. An historical essence is as much a contradiction in terms as an even prime number. Gri⁄ths (1997) and Ereshefsky (2001) endorse the notion of Boyd (1991) that species are 'homeostatic' cluster kinds. These are groups that have the properties that they do because something causes them to have those properties. That something can include common ancestry as well as common molecular structure. The use of the term 'homeostatic' for the property that unites classes of atoms or molecules represents a misleading and inappropriate choice of metaphor. Homeostasis as understood in cybernetics and physiology is a property of physical systems, and it makes no sense at all to predicate it of anything that is not, ontologically speaking of course, an individual. There are any number of compelling reasons for rejecting the notion that species, armies, religions and other supra-organismal wholes are kinds of organisms or of anything else (Ghiselin 1997) . Coleman & Wiley (2001) have lately provided a compelling new argument for the point that when biologists talk about species they are talking about species as composite wholes, not about kinds of organisms.
The properties of taxonomic groups are historically contingent facts. In other words, they are not necessarily true; things could have been otherwise. Another way to say much the same thing is that taxonomic groups, like all individuals, are described rather than de¢ned. At least they do not have de¢n-ing properties, in other words, they have no properties that are logically necessary for a name to apply. To say that synapomorphies 'de¢ne' clades gives a false impression as to the underlying causality. It is problematic to what extent people have been misled by such usage. But the properties that we use to describe or diagnose taxonomic groups are perfectly useful for the kind of descriptive work that systematists do. Furthermore, the fact that a group can change inde¢nitely without ceasing to be the same individual is exactly what we would expect in the light of evolutionary theory. There is no con£ict here, at any rate. The individuality thesis has, however, sparked a lively debate about how we attach names to populations and clades. My solution, which has been taken up by various other authors, has been to say that they are de¢ned ostensively, i.e. by 'pointing' at the thing, including a part of it, such as the type specimen or the common ancestor. This manner of de¢nition is applied in the 'Phylocode', which names clades without attaching any particular rank to them. Without having to endorse such procedures, we should note that important changes are emerging as we rethink our concepts of de¢nition.
The species category as a natural kind
The species category is a natural kind. It is a class of (population level) individuals that play important roles in evolutionary processes, and one about which there are important laws of nature. This is not to say that there are no other natural kinds of interest to evolutionary biologists. I mention only the organism, the cell, and the gene. In a world made up of wholes and parts, it is essential that we scientists recognize the di¡erent kinds of processes that go on at each level, attribute the proper laws to them, and make the proper distinctions.
Some hard choices
The biological species concept treats the species category as a natural kind and marks an important discontinuity. Once species have speciated, the component populations lose their cohesiveness, and thereby become purely historical entities. They do not do anything.The biological species concept treats the most incorporative populational units, i.e. the basic units in speciation theory, as the basic units in taxonomyas well.This identity facilitates the integration of the more nomothetic branches of biology with the more historical ones. We might of course decide to de¢ne 'species' otherwise. One way to accomplish that end would be to de¢ne it so that parts of biological species are, by de¢nition, species. To what level we should descend in deciding what to call a species then becomes problematic. There is nothing to stop us from going below the populational level to that of the organism or for that matter the cell or the molecule.
Either one is to make or not to make a choice. Suppose we decide not to make a choice. In that case, species are not natural kinds, but an inde¢nite range of kinds of things. Under such conditions, we cannot formulate proper laws of nature and otherwise enunciate the sort of propositions that most of us biologists ¢nd interesting. If we carry the 'pluralistic' species concept to its logical conclusion, then saying that Charles Darwin speciated is perfectly acceptable. Observe, however, that whether or not we care about such considerations depends upon our value systems. If one does not have an intellectual life at all it does not matter in the least.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we do make a choice. From the outset I should emphasize that even if we reject the biological species concept we will still need a name for the class of biological species. It has been asserted that there is no privileged level at which evolutionary processes occur. On the contrary, there are many such levels, and the species level is just one of them. Parts of species are quite important, especially the local populations that are adapted to local circumstances. But why should we call such components of species species, any more than we should call my liver an organism? Whether we should give formal taxonomic names to geographical races and local populations has been a controversial topic. A name for every little isolate may seem trivial to some persons^like calling my liver 'Orson'. But the possibility of recognizing such kinds of things and naming them is obvious. There is no compelling reason why we cannot have a classi¢cation in which the parts of biological species are accommodated by ranking them at lower categorical levels. Some people do not like long strings of polynomials, but that is a matter of value judgements again.
There are de¢nite advantages to having a coherent treatment of the various populational levels, with the categories representing natural kinds, and the taxa instances of such kinds. If we are going to discuss species diversity, for instance, it really matters whether we are talking about the same kind of thing, and whether we can invoke the same laws of nature when discussing them or for that matter, whether we can invoke laws of nature at all. This is crucial for our understanding, for example, of the speciation process. It would seem that populations very readily split up into local geographical isolates, but as a general rule these fuse back together with the population as a whole, and they do so after a brief period of time. A small percentage of these populations become changed in such a manner that they tend to remain separate from other populations. Of these, many go extinct, perhaps because of competitive exclusion. Others persist because of character displacement. But at any rate, the ones that make it are de¢nitely in the minority, perhaps a very small minority. Splitting up into local populations, becoming reproductively isolated, and becoming ecologically viable are three di¡erent kinds of process. This justi¢es considering them three di¡erent natural kinds, each with their own characteristic laws of nature.
There is no particular connection between a population being reproductively isolated and the ease with which we can recognize it as such. One of the more interesting developments in the biology of marine organisms over the past few years has been the discovery of large numbers of cryptic species. It has even been proposed that the number of species in many groups has been underestimated by a full order of magnitude (Knowlton 1993 ). If we insist upon delimiting species only when there are clear and easily perceived di¡erences between them, then we might get a seriously distorted view of what is going on. It would tend to underestimate the frequency of speciation, and give the impression that it is associated with major changes in the biology of the organisms and one might draw the conclusion that speciation rate is a limiting factor in the rate of diversi¢cation, when perhaps it is the ecological opportunity for species, once formed, to get established.
At one period in his life, Mayr (1982) advocated linking speci¢c status to occupancy of a distinctive niche. Fortunately, he only ran this proposal up the £agpole brie£y, and for good reason. A simple analogy should drive home the point.When I completed the requirements for my doctorate and was awarded my degree, I possessed what is sometimes called a 'union card'and was quali¢ed to join the faculty of a university. But we would not say that my formal education was incomplete until I had landed a job at Berkeley. The other side of the coin is that ecological diversi¢cation within species often occurs before the evolution of isolating mechanisms. This has been particularly well documented in work on freshwater ¢shes (Stau¡er and McKaye 2001) . Indeed, the occupancy of more than one niche before reproductive isolation has evolved is one of the situations that are conducive to speciation itself.
When species speciate there is ordinarily a period when populations are geographically separated, and for that reason are unable to interbreed, but they are not reproductively isolated, and therefore, could interbreed under certain circumstances. Geographically and reproductively isolated populations are different natural kinds, playing di¡erent roles in evolutionary theory. Populations begin to exist as separate lineages before they become reproductively isolated. Some authors have advocated calling any lineage a species once it has become separated from its closest relative irrespective of whether it has become reproductively isolated. Sometimes, this is done in the name of the'evolutionary species concept' (Wiley1978). This creates problems of incommensurability when we deal with the present situation on the one hand and geological time on the other. At any point in time, there are local isolates that exist perhaps for a few generations then fuse back together with the rest of the population. They may or may not do so depending upon historically contingent fact. Reproductively isolated populations will not do so irrespective of those contingencies because Mayr's law applies to them.
At the symposium where this paper was presented, there was some rather acrimonious debate. Wiley asserted that the biological species concept is undesirable because it has pretensions of predicting the future. This seems to me an ill-founded consideration. Laws of nature in biology are predictive. However, the predictions that they make are generally statistical. Furthermore, the kinds of predictions that they make often assert not that something will happen but rather that it will not happen. Populations that do not fuse as a matter of historically contingent fact on the one hand, and those that both do not and cannot fuse as the consequence of a law of nature on the other, are di¡erent natural kinds.They play di¡er-ent roles in evolutionary theory, and they ought to be clearly distinguished from each other.
If one advantage of the biological species concept derives from its being a natural kind, de¢ned in terms of sex as a cohesive mechanism, that advantage is purchased at the price of having to decide what, if anything, to do with organisms that are not parts of biological species. Metaphysically, the problem is like that of deciding what church a person belongs to after he has been excommunicated.We value the sort of tidiness in which there is a place for everything and everything in its place. I think that there are two answers to this puzzle. The ¢rst is that by treating asexual taxa as pseudospecies we bring our classi¢-cation in line with our interpretation of genera and higher taxa as purely historical entities: they are disconnected lineages that do not function as cohesive units. The second is that we might cope with the nomenclatorial matter by assigning all asexual clones to the biological species that gave rise to them, even if it is now extinct. It would be like calling somebody an excommunicated or lapsed Roman Catholic. The practical di⁄culties of such a step might be formidable and I do not believe that anybody has tried to work out the details. However, such a solution would probably be workable. As a non-workable solution we might mention that of Templeton (1989) . His 'cohesion concept' is a gross misnomer. It provides no mechanism for cohesion over and above sex, just a reason for similarity due to common ecology. It also su¡ers from the usual defects of pluralism: either held together by sex or similar because of similar circumstances and because of that pluralism it does not constitute a legitimate natural kind.
In response to a query by an anonymous referee, I do not think that the existence of sterile organisms within a species creates a real problem, nor that these are like lapsed Roman Catholics. Sterile castes among insects exist because, as Darwin recognized, families are individuals and compete reproductively as units. They are like multicellular organisms with somatic, as well as germinal, tissue (see Ghiselin1974).
One of the most fundamental truths about individuals is that they can undergo an inde¢nite amount of change over time, and yet remain the same thing.
That creates problems both real and imagined for various species concepts. Let us consider the imagined ones ¢rst. If species were so-called extensional classes (sets) of organisms they would be de¢ned, and de¢ned in terms of their membership. If one organism were to die and another to be born, the 'population' would not be the same set. That is one answer to the notion that species are sets rather than individuals, but there are other answers as well.
One unfortunate result of conceptualizing species as extensional classes rather than as individuals is the notion that species are 'non-dimensional'. In other words, they supposedly exist only at a particular moment in time. According to this notion, a species and a lineage cannot be the same individual. Frequently, it has been asserted that the biological species concept has such a non-dimensional character. Where this myth came from is hard to say. Certainly, Mayr never claimed that biological species are non-dimensional. The only advocate of the biological species concept who has maintained that in print would seem to be Bock (1986 Bock ( , 1994 and apparently nobody has ever taken him seriously. Mayr £atly denies it (personal communication). If biological species are populations that evolve and speciate, then they have to be lineages. For that reason we might synonymize quite a number of lineage-based alternatives to the biological species concept. That would include some 'evolutionary' as well as 'cladistic' concepts, though not necessarily all of them.
The matter of how we decide that two'concepts'are equivalent deserves some unpacking. In taxonomy we conclude that the names of species and other taxa are equivalent if they are names for the same thing. That decision is relatively straight forward for individuals, whether they are organisms, species, or higher taxa, though not so straight forward perhaps as one might think. If we agree as to what is, by de¢nition, a species, then all we need to know is whether a name designates exactly the same population; if they do then we consider them 'objective synonyms'. We might, however, have di¡erent species concepts, with the result that one name designates a whole of which the other is a part. The name of the smaller group might be treated as a'subjective synonym'of the name of the larger one.
With respect to the synonymy of such classes as categories, matters are somewhat di¡erent. One might suggest, as have I, that two species concepts are synonymous if they have the same 'extension', i.e. if the class of species so de¢ned had exactly the same members. So far as it goes this makes some sense; people might argue as to what the units mean, but not as to what the units are. Natural kind terms are, however, supposed to re£ect an underlying nomological order, and are at least in principle de¢ned in terms of laws of nature. Di¡erent ways of relating the class of objects to evolutionary theory might give units that are equivalent in the role that they play in evolutionary processes and in evolutionary theory as well. That justi¢es saying that species as populations and species as lineages are indistinguishable once one realises that they are two aspects of the same individuals. Not all lineage-based and population-based concepts are equivalent of course.
Often species concepts are roughly equivalent in both of the aforementioned respects, and yet there are some minor di¡erences. The 'recognition'concept shifts attention toward what holds species together and away from what keeps them apart. If one says that a single population becomes a di¡erent species when the mates come to recognize one another by a new mechanism, then the two concepts are di¡erent in more than just a trivial way, for it would allow a basis for recognizing chronospecies. The evolutionary species concept as ¢rst propounded by Simpson was basically an attempt to make the biological species concept seem more of a diachronic matter. But when species rank is recognized as soon as there is geographical isolation, and before reproductive isolation, it becomes equivalent to some phylogenetic species concepts.There is no such thing as'the' phylogenetic species concept. There are an inde¢nite number of phylogenetic species concepts, and the biological species concept is one of them. Phylogenetic species are either entire biological species, or parts of biological species. Lineages all the way down to a pair of cells can be analysed using cladistic techniques, and there is no particular reason for choosing larger genealogical units over smaller ones. The proponents of the various alternatives seem not at all likely to achieve a consensus, as they themselves admit (Baum and Donoghue 1995) and it should be more or less obvious why. They have di¡erent research agendas and they opt for the one that agrees with their personal values.
Let us not expect the impossible
But can all of us get everything we want? Not if the world evolves more or less as we think it does. Speciation generally takes place over a long series of generations. There will, inevitably be situations in which the issue of speci¢c distinctness is too hard to call.
When speciation occurs according to the dumb bell model, we get a situation in which there is one species followed by a situation in which there are two.What happened to the original species? At a metaphysical level we can answer that question fairly easily: it became a purely historical entity consisting of two species. It is like a ciliate undergoing binary ¢ssion and transforming itself into two cells and two organisms. But what do we do with the range of circumstances under which species split into larger and smaller reproductively isolated populations? Gene trees do not precisely correspond to population-level trees (Nichols 2001) . Furthermore, our ¢ndings, however, well supported by empirical evidence, are notoriously subject to revision in the light of new discoveries. For such reasons it looks as if our classi¢-cations are going to give us only approximations to the underlying historical reality that interests us.
If our formal classi¢cation systems were all we had to go on in dealing with the phenomena of evolution then the sort of semi-arti¢cial arrangements that we have been putting up with would be a much more serious problem that they really are. But when doing research we have access to trees, data matrices, annotations, and in short the whole body of data that allows us to pick and choose the kind of arrangement of our materials that is appropriate to the task at hand. Even the more ardent cladists among my acquaintances do not object to using paraphyletic taxa when ¢ling reprints and tracking the literature are the tasks at hand. The American Society of Ichthyologists and Herpetologists is a professional organization for the studyof not just one paraphyletic taxon, but two of them.
Paraphyletic taxa have the additional advantage of providing a classi¢cation that better corresponds to the vernacular language. That raises the interesting question of how close the agreement ought to be and what sort of compromises, if any, might be made. I cannot endorse the modest proposal of Dupre¤ (2001, p. 203) : 'Species are not individuals, but the units of evolution are.' The idea here is that there should be one way of ordering nature for evolutionary research, another for classi¢cation, perhaps with classi¢cation adapted to the needs of the aquarium trade. Dupre¤ has conceded the ontological point, but not given up the campaign for pluralism, which in his case is based upon a societal agenda. It is one thing to be tolerant and accommodate diversity, whether societal or biotic. However, the main problem with science in contemporary culture is not that scientists know too little, but rather that the general public does not know enough.We face a serious challenge from antiintellectuals in general, not just anti-evolutionists. The enterprise of bestowing vernacular names upon binomials is one example.The dumbing-down of textbooks is another. Depending upon one's value system, it may be perfectly acceptable to have one version of science for the general public, and another for those whose job it is to do research, teach graduate students, and advise governmental agencies about policy. Likewise some people may want to keep the masses ignorant. But others, and I am sure that Dupre¤ is among them, would prefer to live among a society of truly enlightened citizens.
